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ABSTRACT Recent work has demonstrated that self-propagating worms are a real threat to sensor networks.
Since worms can enable an adversary to quickly compromise an entire sensor network, they must be detected
and stopped as quickly as possible. To meet this need, we propose a worm propagation detection scheme
for sensor networks. The proposed scheme applies a sequential analysis to detect worm propagation by
leveraging the intuition that a worm’s communication pattern is different from benign traffic. In particular,
a worm in a sensor network requires a long sequence of packets propagating hop-by-hop to each new infected
node in turn. We thus have detectors that observe communication patterns in the network, a worm spreading
hop-by-hop will quickly create chains of connections that would not be seen in normal traffic. Once detector
nodes identify the worm propagation pattern, they initiate remote software attestations to detect infected
nodes. Through analysis and simulation, we demonstrate that the proposed scheme effectively and efficiently
detects worm propagation. In particular, it blocks worm propagation while restricting the fraction of infected
nodes to at most 13.5% with an overhead of at most 0.63 remote attestations per node per time slot.
INDEX TERMS Wireless sensor networks, sequential analysis, worm detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless sensor networks, an attacker can easily compro-
mise sensor nodes by physically capturing them and then
launch a variety of attacks by exploiting the compromised
nodes. However, finding and physically compromising a large
number of nodes would take time and effort and may put the
attacker at risk of being discovered. A much better option for
the attacker is to capture and compromise just a few nodes and
infect these nodes with self-propagating malware, i.e. with a
worm. By simply reintroducing infected nodes back into the
network, the worm could quickly spread and take over a large
number of sensors, giving the attacker control over much of
the network’s operations.
Until recently, however, there was reason to believe that
existing wireless sensor networks were immune from such
attacks. Sensor motes built on the Harvard architecture keep
code and data separate, making software-based exploits like
buffer overflows difficult to create. Francillon and Castelluc-
cia [3] showed that this belief was wrong by demonstrating a
remote node compromise attack in which malicious code is
loaded permanently into Harvard-architecture sensor motes
and then converted into a self-propagating worm.
This presents a major problem for sensor network secu-
rity. As we have seen on the Internet, worms can spread
very quickly and cause tremendous damage [26]. In a sensor
network, worm propagation allows the attacker to perform
wide-spread node compromise with just a few captured
nodes. Hence, worm propagation attacks should be detected
and stopped as quickly as possible to minimize the potential
for damage in the network.
Although the prevention and detection of worm propaga-
tion attacks are essential to stop wide-spread node compro-
mise in sensor networks, little research has been done to
address this problem. The main work in preventing worm
propagation is by Yang et al. [23], who propose a scheme
based on a software diversity technique. Most sensor motes
operate their main software program from flash memory, and
we call this program the flash program. The main idea of
their approach is to divide the network into a set of grid
cells and assign a different version of the flash program to
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2169-3536 
 2017 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only.
Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
VOLUME 5, 2017
J.-W. Ho, M. Wright: Distributed Detection of Sensor Worms Using Sequential Analysis and Remote Software Attestations
each cell in such a way that two adjacent cells do not share
the same version of the flash program. Although a worm
can infect one cell by exploiting a vulnerability in the flash
program assigned to that cell, it may fail to infect the adjacent
cells due to differences in the software. This approach works
under the assumption that each version of flash program
has vulnerabilities that are distinct from all the others. This
scheme is expanded to consider the case in which multiple
versions of flash programs are installed in a sensor [24].
It may be possible, however, to find different vulnerabilities
in two or more versions of the flash program and get a worm
to spread into some or all of the network. Further, although
there are ways to diversify software automatically [12], there
are no guarantees that the vulnerabilities in one version of
the software are different from those in another version. It is
unclear that providing such a guarantee is any less difficult
than automating the finding and eliminating of security vul-
nerabilities from software in general. Thus, different versions
of the flash program may share a vulnerability such that only
variations on the same exploit are required.
If worm propagation cannot be easily prevented, it may be
detected. A particularly robust way to detect compromised
nodes is with remote software attestation [1], [11], [15],
[17], [22]. The main idea of software attestation is to prove
the integrity of a node’s programs on the basis of software
or hardware. Since any node can attest against any other
nodes and detect compromised nodes without using dedicated
hardware such as TPMs [20], remote software attestation is
a promising technology for discerning any infected nodes in
a resource-constrained sensor network. Ho [8] proposed an
attestation-only scheme in sensor network. This is our prior
work whose main idea is to have each node randomly choose
a set of nodes in each time slot and perform remote attestation
against these nodes whenever it receives packets from them,
thus detecting nodes infected by the worm. Although this
attestation-only approach detects worm propagation with lit-
tle attestation overhead, it could fail to detect infectious nodes
that are not included in the randomly selected set, leading to
a decline in detection capability.
To mitigate this limitation of the attestation-only approach,
we propose a worm propagation detection scheme using the
Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT). We leverage the
following intuition: a worm usually propagates in a hop-by-
hop manner, creating a chain of worm connections. Hence,
we are likely to observe this chain grow link by link when
a worm is being propagated. On the other hand, chains
of benign connections are unlikely to be seen because the
dominant communication pattern is many-to-one, between
multiple source nodes and a single data aggregator, rather
than peer-to-peer communication patterns [9]. This is mainly
because data aggregation is efficient in terms of sensory data
delivery to the base station. We are thus unlikely to observe
communication that looks like packet repropagation in the
benign case. Using this intuition, we apply the SPRT with
a null hypothesis that a worm is not being propagated and
an alternate hypothesis that a worm is being propagated.
In the SPRT, the lower (resp. upper) limit represents benign
(resp. worm) activity, and these limits are dynamically con-
figured in accordance with type of samples. If the number of
samples of benign (resp. worm) activity hits or crosses the
lower (resp. upper) limit, the null (resp. alternate) hypothesis
is accepted. We combine the SPRT with the attestation-only
approach in such a way that the SPRT detects the infectious
nodes missed by the attestation-only approach while still
detecting any infectious nodes that would be found through
the attestation-only approach. Every benign node blocks the
communications from the infectious nodes detected by the
scheme.
The main benefit of the proposed scheme is that it detects
worm propagation quickly. The scheme works against any
type of worm, because it detects the fundamental charac-
teristic of packet repropagation that every type of worm
exhibits. Thus, even if the attacker creates and propagates
zero-day and polymorphic worms that would be difficult for
signature-based schemes to detect, our proposed scheme still
detects them.Moreover, our proposed scheme will not falsely
identify benign nodes as infected nodes. This is because our
proposed scheme is rooted on remote software attestation that
achieves virtually zero false positive.
We validate our proposed scheme through analysis and
simulation. Specifically, we quantitatively show that our
scheme greatly limits the attacker’s gains from worm prop-
agation. We also show analytically that our scheme requires
few samples to make a decision, leading to fast detection and
blocking ofworm propagation. In simulation, we demonstrate
that our scheme quickly detects and stops worm propagation
with less than three samples on average in all cases while
keeping the fraction of infected nodes to at most 13.5%
in all cases. Furthermore, our scheme requires each node
to perform at most 0.63 and 0.31 attestations per node per
time slot in the case of no worm and the case of a worm,
respectively. These simulation results signify that our scheme
quickly detects worm and minimizes the damage incurred
by worm at the cost of very few attestations. Our proposed
approach leverages both software attestation and the SPRT,
and we show that it achieves better worm detection capability
than our prior attestation-only approach [8] with very little
additional attestation overhead. In particular, our proposed
scheme reduces the number of infected nodes between 16.9%
and 43.6% compared with our prior work.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. §II presents
related work. §III then describes the network assumptions
and attacker models for our proposed scheme. In §IV, we
describe our worm propagation detection scheme using the
SPRT with a randomized sampling strategy and analyzes its
security and performance. §V presents the simulation results
for the proposed scheme, and §VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we first briefly describe why prior work in
Internet worm detection and prevention cannot be applied to
sensor networks. We then discuss work showing that worms
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are a threat to networks of sensors with various system archi-
tectures, and finally we point out the limitations of related
work in worm propagation prevention and detection for sen-
sor networks.
A. INTERNET WORMS
The existing solutions [10], [13], [14], [16] designed for
Internet worm detection and prevention cannot be directly
applied for sensor networks. This is mainly because they rely
on secure infrastructure that is not available in sensor net-
works. In particular, signature detection approaches [10], [14]
require substantial computation overhead for signature gen-
eration and maintenance, which is not suitable for resource-
constrained sensor networks.
Even though we are the first to apply the SPRT to detect
worm in wireless sensor networks, Schechter et al. [16]
adapted the SPRT to detect scanning worms in the Internet.
This approach leverages the intuition that scanning worms are
very likely to cause connection failures when they try to infect
susceptible nodes. As this approach can only be used to detect
worms that scan the network for targets, it is not appropriate
for sensor networks, in which target nodes can simply be
neighbor nodes. On the other hand, our proposed scheme can
be applied to detect any types of worm because it leverages
the fundamental characteristic of packet repropagation that
every type of worm exhibits. Therefore, our scheme is a more
general SPRT-centric approach than that of Schechter et al. in
terms of sensor worm detection.
B. WORMS IN SENSOR NETWORKS
Several researchers have recently showed the feasibility
of malicious code injection attacks and worm propaga-
tion attacks against sensor devices [3]–[5]. Specifically,
Gu et al. [5] experimented with transient malicious code
execution on Mica2 motes and explored the possibility
of malicious code propagation. Goodspeed [4] proposed
a way of running malicious codes on the MSP430-based
TelosB motes. Francillon and Castelluccia [3] conducted
experiments with permanent malicious code execution on a
MicaZ mote that is one of Atmel AVR-based sensor devices.
Moreover, they also demonstrated that the malicious code can
be easily extended to a self-propagating worm. Thus, it is
clear that an attacker could build a worm that can propagate
even on sensor motes built upon the Harvard architecture.
C. WORM PREVENTION IN SENSOR NETWORKS
There are few works studying the prevention of worm prop-
agation in sensor networks. Specifically, Yang et al. [23]
proposed a software diversity technique to prevent worm
propagation in sensor networks. In this work, the network
is divided into a set of grid cells and a group of sensors are
deployed in each cell. A flash program is then installed into
each node in such a way that all nodes in the same cell have
the same version of the program, but nodes in adjacent cells
have different programs. Thus, even if an attacker creates a
worm by exploiting the vulnerability of a version of flash
program assigned to a cell and infects the entire cell with that
worm, the worm will fail to infect the adjacent cells if the
programs in those cells have different vulnerabilities. This
technique is extended to deal with the worm prevention in
case that multiple flash versions are installed in a sensor [24].
The main strength of this work is that it prevents a worm
from propagating between two adjacent cells, and hence the
rest of the network, with little overhead. However, it is hard
to automatically make the different versions of a flash pro-
gram possess different vulnerabilities. We do not need this
scheme if we succeed in discovering different vulnerabilities,
since we could then fix them. On the other hand, a worm
could infect all sensor nodes by exploiting any unidentified
common vulnerability shared by all versions of flash pro-
gram. Furthermore, if different vulnerabilities can be found
in two or more versions of the code, the worm code could
be programmed with all the exploits. This worm can first
infect one cell and then switch vulnerabilities to infect one
of the neighboring cells, thereby spreading through much of
the network.
Gui et al. [6] investigated the impact of using a software
diversity technique on worm infection prevention through
active sensor nodes when the active state periods of nodes are
determined by random node scheduling. Liu et al. [25] also
proposed a software diversity technique combined with using
a role-based graph coloring in sensor networks. Since these
schemes are based on the software diversity technique, they
have the same restrictions as in [23] and [24]. Sun et al. [19]
deterred or decelerated worm propagation by employing a set
of immune nodes. However, this approach does not describe
the specific details of how worm propagation is blocked
by immune nodes while largely focusing on immune node
selection mechanism.
Shen et al. [18] formulate differential-equations based
game to model the dynamics between attack and defense
in terms of malware propagation in sensor network. It then
derive the optimal dynamic strategies for attack and defense.
Although this work presents a game theoretical framework to
restrain malware propagation in sensor networks, however, it
does not provide actual prevention technique to stop worm
propagation in sensor networks.
D. WORM DETECTION IN SENSOR NETWORKS
To the best of our knowledge, our previous work [8] is the
first contribution for worm detection in sensor networks. The
key idea of [8] is to have each node perform the remote
attestation against a set of nodes that are randomly chosen
in each time slot. The attestation of a node in the set only
occurs when the attesting node receives packets in that time
slot from the node. Although this approach efficiently detects
sensor worms with little overhead, it could fail to detect
infectious nodes that do not belong to the randomly chosen
set. To overcome this limitation, we leverage the SPRT to
improve the detection capability of our previous work [8]
with additional little overhead. Note that the basic idea of our
proposed scheme originates from the chapter 7 of the first
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author’s Ph.D. thesis [7]. However, we tremendously revise
and improve the chapter 7 in Ph.D. thesis in terms of scheme,
security analysis, and evaluation. The biggest distinct point
is how the SPRT is incorporated into the remote software
attestation technique. In chapter 7 of Ph.D. thesis, sensor
worm detection mostly depends on the SPRT while getting
little aid of remote software attestation, leading to failure in
very slow worm detection. However, our proposed scheme
utilizes the balanced cooperation of the SPRT and attestation,
leading to the efficient and effective worm detection.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first describe the network assumptions and
then the attacker model for our proposed scheme.
A. NETWORK ASSUMPTIONS
We assume a static sensor network, in which the locations
of sensor nodes are not changed after being placed over the
network field.
B. ATTACKER MODELS
We assume that the attacker sets up a set of compromised
nodes to be worm originators and has them spread the worm
over the network, thereby seeking to gain control of as much
of the network as possible without being detected. Since
an epidemic model provides a useful way to estimate the
expected rate of infection and numbers of infected nodes at
various points of time, it is widely used for worm propagation
modeling in the Internet, and thus we adopt it to model worm
propagation in sensor networks. Specifically, we make use of
the discrete time version of the simple epidemic model [2], in
which the overall rate of new infections is given by:
dIt
dt
= ρIt [N − It ] (1)
and the infection quota is determined in units of time slots
according to the following equation:
It = (1+ ρN )It−1 − ρI2t−1, (2)
where N is the total number of sensor nodes in the network,
and ρ is the pairwise infection rate [2]. I0 indicates the
number of worm originators. It is the cumulative infection
quota from the 0th time slot to the tth time slot. Accordingly,
the infection quota in the tth time slot is calculated as It−It−1.
In this model, we assume that a sensor has only two states:
susceptible and infectious. All sensor nodes are initially in
the susceptible state except worm originators that are in the
infectious state. Once a susceptible node is infected by worm,
its state is changed to infectious.
We also assume an intelligent worm attack in which infec-
tious nodes do not try to infect benign nodes that have already
performed attestation against the worm and found an infec-
tion. This assumption is reasonable in the sense that worm
infection can be progressed quickly without wasting time in
multiple infection attempts on these benign nodes. Note that
this assumption is not used in our prior work [8], where the
worm instead tries to infect any benign nodes.
We must not only model the rate of propagation, but also
how the worm propagates through the network. We assume
that the attacker employs a hop-by-hop worm propagation
strategy in which each infectious node propagates the worm
to its neighboring susceptible nodes. Sensor networks gener-
ally use localized protocols for clustering, data aggregation,
and other activities [9], and they do not have much scope for
arbitrary multi-hop peer-to-peer communication. If the worm
is not propagated in a neighbor-to-neighbor fashion, and thus
does not exhibit the common pattern of normal local traffic, it
would be easy to detect the worm propagation. To reduce the
chance of being detected, the attacker will thus rely on a hop-
by-hop propagation strategy that makes worm propagation
look like the normal local traffic.
When this hop-by-hop propagation strategy is used
together with the epidemic model, however, it could fail to
meet the worm infection quota in a given time slot, because
the infectious nodes could have few susceptible neighbors at
that time. In this case, we assume that the infectious nodes
maintain the infection rate by choosing susceptible nodes at
random from the network and propagating the worm to them.
Since sensor networks typically have dense node deploy-
ments to ensure networking and sensing coverage, each node
will likely have sufficient neighbors to make the hop-by-
hop propagation strategy dominate over random propagation,
keeping the chance of detection low.
IV. WORM DETECTION USING THE RANDOMIZED-SPRT
In this section, we describe and analyze our approach to
detecting worms in sensor networks. First, we discuss the use
of attestation in detecting infected nodes in sensor networks,
including why an approach based on attestation alone is
insufficient for worm detection. We then present how we can
detect worms effectively by combining a statistical decision
mechanism together with attestation, leading to the details
of our proposed scheme. Finally, we analyze the proposed
scheme’s security and performance.
A. ATTESTATION
To detect infected nodes, we could rely on remote software
attestation techniques [1], [11], [15], [17], [22]. The key idea
of these techniques is to validate the integrity of another
node’s programs on the basis of software or hardware. Since
any node can attest against any other nodes without the aid
of specialized hardware such as TPMs [20], remote software
attestation is a promising technology for identifying any
infected nodes in a sensor network. Moreover, this technique
fulfills virtually zero false positives, indicating that benign
nodes will not be detected as the infectious nodes.
In our prior work [8], we proposed an attestation-only
approach that utilizes remote software attestation to detect
worm propagation in sensor networks. Specifically, each
node randomly selects a set of attestees per time slot.
Whenever each node receives data packets from the nodes
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belonging to a randomly chosen attestee set, it performs attes-
tations against these nodes and detects any nodes infected
by the worm. Since attestation is performed randomly, this
approach detects worm propagation with little attestation
overhead. However, it could miss the worm propagation
incurred by nodes that are not included in the randomly
chosen attestee set, contributing to decay in the detection
capability.
B. INTEGRATING THE SPRT WITH ATTESTATION
To mitigate this limitation of our prior work, we first propose
a worm detection scheme based on the Sequential Probability
Ratio Test (SPRT), which is a statistical decision process
that makes fast and accurate decision with a small number
of samples. We then integrate the SPRT-based scheme with
attestation such that attestation-only is first applied and then
the SPRT is adapted to detect the worm propagation missed
by attestation-only. The main merit of this integration is in
achieving efficient and effective worm propagation detection
while keeping the attestation overhead low. In other words,
each node independently detects worm propagation through
attestation while a group of nodes in a region collaborate to
catch worm propagation through the SPRT, creating a robust
worm detection capability with low attestation overhead.
The specific details of our proposed scheme are presented
in the following section.
C. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
We first introduce the basic intuition and concept of the
SPRT-based worm detection scheme. We then describe three
phases in the proposed scheme that integrates the SPRT-based
scheme with attestation-only approach.
For worm propagation detection in sensor networks, we
leverage the simple intuition that the propagation pattern
of worms is different from the patterns of benign packets.
In particular, let us consider a worm scenario in which an
infectious node A sends a worm to a susceptible node B and
infects B with it. After being infected by A, an infectious
B will repropagate the worm to a susceptible node C to
infect it. Hence, if we sample the traffic being sent between
the nodes in this region, we will observe a packet sent from
A to B followed by a packet sent from B to C . We call this
communication pattern a chain.
The main difference between chain and multi-hop commu-
nication is as follows: Each hop or link in a chain represents
a message sent from the source to the destination, whereas
multi-hop communication occurs between one source and
one destination with multiple intermediate nodes as the hops.
As shown in Figure 1, there are two pairs of source and
destination in a A − B − C chain. On the other hand, there
is only one pair of source and destination in a A − C multi-
hop communication.
In a local region, multiple data source nodes usually
send their sensor readings to a single data aggregator while
rotating the role of data aggregator between them. Due to
its efficiency, this many-to-one approach is the dominant
FIGURE 1. A− B multi-hop communication is created by packet sent
from from A to B via intermediate nodes, whereas the A− B− C chain is
created by a packet sent from A to B followed by packet sent from B to C .
communication pattern in a local region of a sensor
network [9]. In the entire network, multiple aggregators usu-
ally form a hierarchical structure in such a way that the
aggregated data is transmitted from lower-level aggregators
up to higher-level ones in a tree structure, eventually reaching
the base station. Note that higher-level aggregation also forms
a many-to-one communication pattern.
We can see quantitatively the efficiency gain of many-to-
one data aggregation. Let us assume that there are g sensor
nodes in a region and let us denote the average hop distance
between two randomly chosen nodes by . In the case that
individual nodes directly send data to the receiver, the average
number of hops for data reporting would be O(g × ).
In the case of data aggregation, the average number of hops
would be O(g + ), which is much lower communication
overhead.
In a benign many-to-one communication scenario, short
chains may occur because the normal sensor data usually
traverses a few aggregators from a source to the base station.
As a result, the likelihood of the occurrence of a chain in a
benign scenario will be less than that of a chain when a worm
is being propagated.
Using this intuition, we apply the Sequential Probabil-
ity Ratio Test (SPRT) [21] to the worm propagation detec-
tion problem. Specifically, we define an alternate (resp.
null) hypothesis that the worm is (resp. not) being prop-
agated. The SPRT starts in the middle between the alter-
nate hypothesis and null hypothesis and accepts the alternate
(resp. null) hypothesis if the number of times that packet
repropagation occurs hits or crosses the upper (resp. lower)
threshold.
Our proposed scheme consists of three phases: a Setup
Phase, an Attestation-only Phase, and a SPRT-Attestation
Phase. In the setup phase, the network operator and each
sensor node set up the necessary things for running the other
two phases. In the attestation-only phase, each node performs
remote attestations against randomly chosen attestees and
detects worm propagation incurred by infectious attestees.
If there are nodes that were not examined in the attestation-
only phase and there are a certain number of compromised
nodes in a region, the SPRT-attestation phase is initiated.
In this phase, the SPRT is performed against the nodes
unchecked in attestation-only phase. If the SPRT accepts
the alternate hypothesis, infectious nodes are then detected
through further remote attestations.
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1) SETUP PHASE
a: PRE-DEPLOYMENT
In the pre-deployment stage, the network operator assigns
every sensor node a unique ID and secret key material for
pairwise key establishment. A hop-by-hop authentication
mechanism is used to check whether a packet is sent by
nodes with legitimate key material. More specifically, when
a node transmits a packet to its neighbors, it authenticates the
packet using a message authentication code (MAC), which is
generated with a secret key shared between them. Therefore,
upon receiving a worm packet, the susceptible node first
checks its MAC and accepts it only if it is authentic. This
means that worm packets should originate from the infectious
nodes having legitimate secret key material.
b: DETECTOR ELECTION
After deployment, every sensor node discovers its neighbors
and then elects itself as a worm propagation detector with
probability pd , which is configured in the pre-deployment
stage. A worm propagation detector also acts as an attester.
Before processing the received packets, an attester performs
remote attestation against the nodes that send packets to the
attester. If an attester decides through remote attestation that
the packet sender has been compromised, it will not com-
municate with it further. Therefore, the worm propagation
detector is able to attest and detect any infectious nodes before
processing worm packets and thus is virtually immune to
worm infection. Each node repeats this detector selection
process periodically. Hence, each node will likely function
as a detector in rotation. This random rotation process will
prevent the detectors from being exposed to attacker and
also helps nodes save the energy consumption incurred by
performing the detector function.
2) ATTESTATION-ONLY PHASE
Before the start of each time slot, each node i acts as an
attester and chooses a set of attestees A, |A| = m, uniformly
at random from the entire node space. If attester i receives
a packet from node j ∈ A, it performs remote attestation
against j. If j is determined to be infectious, i blocks all
communication from j. Then, node i sends an attester noti-
fication message to its neighboring nodes. After receiving
this message, every neighboring node of i performs remote
attestations against any nodes that send packets to itself
before processing these packets. If it decides that the packet
sender is infected by worm, it blocks all communications
from the infected node. Attesters will also block all communi-
cations from any infectious nodes denying attestation process
while sending packets to attesters. If benign nodes could not
participate in attestation process due to unreliable network
connection, they would also be unable to communicate with
attesters, thereby being discerned from malicious refusal to
attestation process.
Attester notification messages are authenticated using
MAC with a secret key shared between i and i’s neighboring
node. This authentication will be used to prevent DoS attacks
incurred by malicious nodes. Specifically, if a malicious node
sends a large number of fake attester notification messages
to the nodes in a benign region, these nodes receiving the
messages will perform many attestations against each other
but will not find any malicious nodes, incurring lots of attes-
tation overhead. However, if each node in benign region could
process attester notificationmessages up to a preset threshold,
discern the fake message senders based on their MACs, and
block all further communications from them, the attacker will
take little benefit from this type of DoS attack.
If node i receives a packet from node k that does not belong
to the attestee list A, it first checks whether the fraction of
compromised nodes among its neighbors is greater than or
equal to a preset threshold τ . If so, node i initiates the SPRT-
Attestation Phase. The main rationale behind this check is
to prevent the SPRT from being run in a benign situation
where all nodes are benign in the network. Thus, the overhead
incurred by the SPRT will be zero in a benign situation.
3) SPRT-ATTESTATION PHASE
a: COMMUNICATION PATTERN BROADCAST
Once in the SPRT-Attestation phase, each time node u
receives a packet from node v, u first performs packet pre-
processing as follows. Node u checks whether v and u are
the source and destination of the packet, respectively. If so,
node u immediately broadcasts the source and destinations
IDs of the received packet to its neighbors. We call a pair
of the source and destination IDs a communication pattern,
or simply a pattern. Upon receiving the pattern, u’s neighbor
accepts it if u acts as a worm propagation detector. Otherwise,
it discards the pattern. The pseudocode for a Packet Prepro-
cessing Unit (PPU) is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Packet Preprocessing Unit (PPU)
INPUT: incoming packet pkt
if pkt .destination == u and pkt .source == u’s neighbor then
broadcast <pkt.sourceID, pkt.destinationID> to
neighbors
end if
As previously described, many-to-one communications
are the dominant pattern observed in both the local region
and globally. As a result, the communication patterns are
not frequently broadcasted, and the pattern broadcast over-
head will be reasonable. In Section IV-E, we analyti-
cally show that the communication pattern overhead is not
substantial.
Since a worm usually consists of multiple packets [3], it
takes a certain amount of time to infect a node. As a result,
node u is able to broadcast a communication pattern of worm
packets before being infected. Moreover, the base station
does not generate and broadcast the communication pattern,
because it is the final destination of the data sent by sensor
nodes and thus never repropagates the packets.
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Furthermore, communication patterns are transmitted in
plaintext. Thus, compromised nodes can generate and send
fake patterns with the IDs of their neighbors that contribute
to occurrence of merged patterns, resulting in false positives.
However, once worm propagation is detected, the compro-
mised nodes will be attested by their neighbors, detected and
isolated from the network. Therefore, this type of attack will
lead to the detection of the compromised nodes and is not
useful for the attacker.
Every detector w divides the time domain into a series of
time slots and performs worm propagation detection upon
receiving the patterns from its neighbors. Note that each
detector w independently maintains its time domain and thus
there is no need to operate time synchronization process in
the network. More specifically, w records the IDs of all of its
neighbors. Each time w receives a pattern (si, di) such that
si 6= di in a given time slot, w stores si in its memory in
such a way that si is linked to di. It then creates a merged
pattern (sj, si, di) if it already has a pattern (sj, dj) such that
si = dj and sj 6= di. If w creates multiple merged patterns
per (si, di) such as (sj1, si, di), . . . , (sjk , si, di), it accepts only
one merged pattern (sj1, si, di) and discards other ones. This
is mainly because one merged pattern is enough to fully
capture a packet repropagation performed by si. Hence, at
most one merged pattern is created per incoming pattern.
We use the merged pattern as evidence for the occurrence
of packet repropagation. As a result, as we observe more
merged patterns, there will be a higher likelihood of worm
propagation. Detector w refreshes the pattern information by
erasing them at the end of each time slot. The main rationale
behind this refresh is to reduce the likelihood that a benign
pattern creates a merged pattern and accordingly minimizes
the likelihood that benign packet transmission ismisclassified
as worm propagation. For efficient pattern processing, detec-
tor w does not deal with the same communication pattern
more than once in a time slot, even if it receives multiple same
communication patterns.
b: WORM DETECTION BASED ON THE RANDOMIZED-SPRT
We first describe how the Sequential Probability Ratio
Test (SPRT) is used to detect a worm attack and then point out
the limitation of the SPRT against an intelligent worm attack.
Finally, we present a Randomized-SPRT scheme in order to
enhance the security resilience of the SPRT-based detection.
The SPRT is a statistical decision process in which it takes
a sample and it moves toward the upper (resp. lower) limit in
accordance with the type of sample, leading to the acceptance
of the alternate (resp. null) hypothesis [21]. We define H1
(resp. H0) as the alternate (resp. null) hypothesis that a worm
is (resp. is not) being propagated.
More specifically, let Ck (k ≥ 1) denote the kth pattern
received and stored by detector w. We define a Bernoulli
random variableAk as follows: IfCk creates a merged pattern,
we set Ak = 1. Otherwise, we set Ak = 0. We define the
success probability γ of the Bernoulli distribution as γ =
Pr(Ak = 1) = 1−Pr(Ak = 0). Since H0 and H1 are mutually
disjoint in the entire sample space, we have:
Pr(Ak ) = Pr(Ak |H0)× Pr(H0)+ Pr(Ak |H1)× Pr(H1) (3)
By only considering Pr(Ak = 1), we have
Pr(Ak = 1|H0) = Pr(Ak= 1)− Pr(Ak= 1|H1)× Pr(H1)Pr(H0)
Pr(Ak = 1|H1) = Pr(Ak= 1)− Pr(Ak= 1|H0)× Pr(H0)Pr(H1)
(4)
Pr(Ak = 1) indicates the probability that merged pattern
occurs. From Equation 4, we have the intuitive interpretation
that Pr(Ak = 1|H0) increases as Pr(Ak = 1|H1)× Pr(H1)
decreases. Also, the lower Pr(Ak = 1|H0)× Pr(H0) is, the
higher Pr(Ak = 1|H1) is.
Given predefined thresholds γ0 and γ1 such that γ0 < γ1,
if the detector finds that γ ≤ γ0, it is likely that a worm
is not being propagated. On the other hand, if γ ≥ γ1, it
is likely that a worm is being propagated. The problem of
deciding whether a worm is likely being propagated or not
can be formulated as a hypothesis testing problem with null
and alternate hypotheses of γ ≤ γ0 and γ ≥ γ1, respectively.
Based on this problem formulation, we describe how detec-
tor w runs the SPRT to make a decision about worm propa-
gation from the n observed samples, where Ak is treated as a
sample. The log-probability ratio on n samples Rn is given as:
Rn = ln Pr(A1, . . . ,An|H1)Pr(A1, . . . ,An|H0)
We assume that Ak is independent and identically distributed.
The main rational behind this i.i.d. assumption on Ak is
as follows: In the case of benign traffic, Ak will likely be
independent because the merged patterns could be generated
by benign packet transmission. In the case of a worm, the
question is whether there is independence of Ak ’s given H1.
In other words, although the probability that Ak = 1 is higher
for all k when H1 is true, we only require independence
between samples given that fixed probability. Still, there may
be correlations due to the worm activity. Correlation between
consecutive samples, however, makes detection more likely.
For example, a series of 1’s will quickly drive the detector
to accept alternate hypothesis H1. It becomes an interesting
question as to whether a slow worm can evade detection by
careful spacing of activity (creating Ak = 0 several times in
a row). He can know that the SPRT has either accepted H0 or
moved below the halfway point with high probability before
he propagates the worm to create the next linked pattern.
The challenge for the attacker is that multiple detectors are
watching multiple nodes, so perfect coordination with no
detection at any point will make the worm extremely slow.
Then Rn can be rewritten as:
Rn = ln
∏n
k=1 Pr(Ak |H1)∏n
k=1 Pr(Ak |H0)
=
n∑
k=1
ln
Pr(Ak |H1)
Pr(Ak |H0) (5)
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Let ϕn denote the number of times that Ak = 1 in the
n samples. Then we have
Rn = ϕn ln γ1
γ0
+ (n− ϕn) ln 1− γ11− γ0 (6)
where γ0 = Pr(Ak = 1|H0), γ1 = Pr(Ak = 1|H1).
On the basis of the log-probability ratio Rn, the SPRT for
H0 against H1 is given as follows:
• ϕn ≤ l0(n) : accept H0 and terminate the test.
• ϕn ≥ l1(n) : accept H1 and terminate the test
• l0(n) < ϕn < l1(n) : continue the test with another
observation.
Where α′ is a user-configured false positive rate and β ′ is a
user-configured false negative rate.
l0(n) =
ln β
′
1−α′ + n ln 1−γ01−γ1
ln γ1
γ0
− ln 1−γ11−γ0
, l1(n) =
ln 1−β
′
α′ + n ln 1−γ01−γ1
ln γ1
γ0
− ln 1−γ11−γ0
Although the SPRT-based approach quickly and accurately
detects worm attacks, it will fail to detect intelligent worm
attacks in which a worm could dynamically change its infec-
tion rate. This is because, if the SPRT-based approach uses a
fixed  to a low value for quick worm detection, an intelligent
worm will adaptively change its infection rate to a low value,
leading to a failure to detect the worm. Putting it a differ-
ent way, the SPRT-based approach is vulnerable to a slow
worm attack in which the worm slowly infects benign sensor
nodes and thereby reduces the likelihood of the occurrence
of merged communication patterns, making worm look like
benign traffic under a low  value.
To mitigate this limitation of the SPRT-based approach, we
propose a randomized sampling approach in which the SPRT
randomly takes the samples of type H0 with less weight than
the ones of type H1, where  acts as a weighting factor. More
specifically, we consider a round required for the decision
process to reach a decision. For each round,  is selected
uniformly at random from the range of [1, max) such that
max > 1. We call this approach of using SPRT with random-
ized sampling Randomized-SPRT. Because Randomized-
SPRT randomly selects samples of type H0 less frequently
than the ones of H1, the decision for acceptance of H1 will
be expedited. Accordingly, the Randomized-SPRT acts as
an effective and efficient countermeasure against intelligent
worm with dynamic infection rates and slow worms.
For each round, we construct the SPRT with randomized
sampling by substituting (γ0) for γ0 in the SPRT. In the case
that  > 1, γ0 > (γ0) holds, and thus the samples with type
H0 are chosen with less weight than the ones with type H1,
leading to a speed-up in the acceptance of H1.
In randomized sampling, the log-probability on n samples
Ln is changed to:
Ln = ϕn ln γ1(γ0) + (n− ϕn) ln
1− γ1
1− (γ0)
Accordingly, the SPRT for H0 against H1 is changed to:
• ϕn ≤ l0(n) : accept H0 and terminate the test.
• ϕn ≥ l1(n) : accept H1 and terminate the test
• l0(n) < ϕn < l1(n) : continue the test process with
another observation.
Where:
l0(n) =
ln β
′
1−α′ + n ln 1−(γ0)

1−γ1
ln γ1(γ0) − ln
1−γ1
1−(γ0)
,
l1(n) =
ln 1−β
′
α′ + n ln 1−(γ0)

1−γ1
ln γ1(γ0) − ln
1−γ1
1−(γ0)
c: STOPPING THE WORM
If the randomized-SPRT terminates in the acceptance of
H1 (resp. H0), detector w decides that the worm is likely
(resp. is not) being propagated within its vicinity. When H0
is accepted, w restarts the randomized-SPRT. When H1 is
accepted,w performs the remote attestations against its neigh-
boring nodes to detect the nodes infected by the worm. Then,
as with Attestation-Only, w stops receiving communications
from the infectious nodes and sends attester notifications
messages to its neighbors. The neighbors similarly attest the
nodes that send packets to themselves before processing the
packets and then block their communications from infectious
nodes. As in Attestation-Only phase, attester notification
message is authenticated using MACwith a secret key shared
between w and w’s neighbor to prevent DoS attacks incurred
bymalicious nodes. Any infectious nodes maliciously declin-
ing the attestation process are isolated from the network as in
Attestation-Only phase.
D. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we describe the resilience of the Randomized-
SPRT scheme against worm infections. Recall that our
proposed scheme is based on remote software attestation ful-
filling virtually zero false positives. Thus, we do not present
any analysis on false positives.
In the following Lemma, we investigate how many sus-
ceptible nodes are infected when a detector detects worm
propagation in its vicinity.
Lemma 1: Let ζ denote the fraction of merged commu-
nication patterns incurred by worm propagation out of n
communication patterns that detector w receives in its vicinity
and processes. Given n communication patterns, w detects
worm propagation in its vicinity if at least ζ ∗× n nodes in its
vicinity are infected such that
ζ ∗ = ln
1−β ′
α′ + n ln 1−(γ0)

1−γ1
(ln γ1(γ0) − ln
1−γ1
1−(γ0) )n
Proof: Since ϕn is the number of times that the merged
communication pattern occurs in n communication patterns,
ϕn = ζ × n holds. According to the Randomized-SPRT, w
detects worm propagation in its vicinity if ϕn ≥ l1(n), which
is rewritten as ζ ≥ ζ ∗ such that ζ ∗ = ln
1−β′
α′ +n ln
1−(γ0)
1−γ1
(ln γ1(γ0)
−ln 1−γ11−(γ0) )n
. Note
that one merged communication pattern indicates that one
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susceptible node is infected. For simplicity, we assume that
the infected nodes do not try to reinfect other infected nodes.
Hence, ζ × n merged communication patterns correspond to
ζ × n infected nodes. Accordingly, if the number of infected
nodes is at least ζ ∗ × n, worm propagation in the vicinity of
w is detected. 
FIGURE 2. The affects of  and n on ζ∗ × n, which is the minimum
number of infected nodes required for detector w to detect worm
propagation in its vicinity.
Using Lemma 1, we now investigate how changing values
of  and n impact ζ ∗ × n. For this study, we set α′ = β ′ =
0.01, γ0 = 0.1, γ1 = 0.9. As shown in Figure 2, we see that
ζ ∗×n increases in proportion to n. This implies that a detector
can significantly restrain the number of infected nodes as
long as it detects worm propagation with a small number of
communication patterns. For example, a detector is able to
limit the number of infected nodes to no more than eight if it
detects worm propagation with at most ten samples. Given a
value of n, we observe that ζ ∗ × n decreases as  increases.
This means that Randomized-SPRT with larger values of 
achieves better resilience against worm infections.
Next, we investigate the detection capability of the
Randomized-SPRT in terms of time measured in number
of rounds. Recall that we consider a round required for the
Randomized-SPRT to reach a decision and  is selected per
round uniformly at random from the range of [1, max) such
that max > 1. Since  is randomly determined every round,
it is difficult for the attacker to predict  in each round.
Hence, the attacker is not likely to attempt to adjust the
worm infection rate. The following lemma further explains
the resilience of the Randomized-SPRT.
Lemma 2: Suppose that the values of  in the Randomized-
SPRT are 1, 2, . . . , w−1, w in w rounds.Moreover, assume
that the Randomized-SPRT with i (1 ≤ i ≤ w) is terminated
in processing n communication patterns. Then the lower
bound on probability Pw that worm propagation is detected
before the (w+ 1)th round is 1− e−
∑w
i=1 Pis , where
Pis = 1−
ln 1−β
′
α′ + n ln 1−(γ0)
i
1−γ1
n(ln γ1(γ0)i − ln
1−γ1
1−(γ0)i )
FIGURE 3. Lower bound on Pw vs. w when max = 3.0.
Proof: For each round i, the Randomized-SPRT with
i terminates in acceptance of H1 if ϕn ≥ l1(n) holds, leading
to worm propagation detection. Thus, the worm propagation
detection probability in each round i is calculated as
Pis =
n− l1(n)
n
= 1− ln
1−β ′
α′ + n ln 1−(γ0)
i
1−γ1
n(ln γ1(γ0)i − ln
1−γ1
1−(γ0)i )
If worm propagation detection succeeds in at least one round
before the (w+1)th round, worm propagation will be detected
before the (w + 1)th round. Therefore, Pw is computed as
1−
w∏
i=1
(1−Pis). By using the property (1+ x) ≤ ex , we have
Pw = 1−
w∏
i=1
(1− Pis) ≥ 1− e−
∑w
i=1 Pis

Using Lemma 2, we explore how the lower bound on Pw
is affected by n and w. For this study, we consider a scenario
in which the system has the same value of  in all w rounds
such that max = 1 = 2 = · · · = n−1 = n, leading
to P1s = P2s = · · · = Pw−1s = Pws . This scenario indicates
that the worm is propagated with the same γ in all w rounds.
The reason why we use this scenario is because it helps to
evaluate the detection capability of the system with max .
As shown in Figure 3, when max = 3.0, we see that an
increase in both the number of rounds and the number of
communication patterns contributes to a rise in the lower
bound on Pw. With any number of communication patterns,
however, only a few rounds are required to raise Pw above
0.8. In less than 10 rounds, detection of the worm is virtually
assured.
E. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first compute how many samples are
required on average for the Randomized-SPRT to reach a
decision. We then present the communication and storage
overheads of our proposed scheme.
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FIGURE 4. The effect of γ0 and γ1 on the expected number of samples
conditioned on H0 (no worm) and H1 (worm).
1) AVERAGE NUMBER OF SAMPLES FOR A DECISION
We denote by n the number of samples that are required
for the SPRT to terminate. n is considered to be a random
variable because it is determined in accordance with the
types of samples. Recall that H0 is the null hypothesis (the
benign case) and H1 is the alternate hypothesis (a worm
is being propagated). According to [21], we calculate E[n]
conditioned on hypotheses H0 and H1 as follows:
E[n|H0] =
(1− α′) ln β ′1−α′ + α′ ln 1−β
′
α′
γ0 ln
γ1
γ0
+ (1− γ0) ln 1−γ11−γ0
E[n|H1] =
β ′ ln β
′
1−α′ + (1− β ′) ln 1−β
′
α′
γ1 ln
γ1
γ0
+ (1− γ1) ln 1−γ11−γ0
(7)
Figure 4 shows how γ0 and γ1 affect E[n|H0] and E[n|H1]
when α′ = β ′ = 0.01. We see that the SPRT reaches a
decision with a small number of samples when γ0 and γ1 are
set to a small value and a large value, respectively. We also
observe thatE[n|H0] is larger thanE[n|H1] when γ0 is a small
value. However, as γ0 increases, the gap betweenE[n|H0] and
E[n|H1] decreases and eventually E[n|H1] exceeds E[n|H0].
This means that a small value of γ0 contributes to the
faster termination of the SPRT in acceptance of the alternate
hypothesis than the null one.
Recall that  is selected per time round uniformly at
random from the range of [1, max) such that max > 1.
By replacing γ0 with (γ0) in E[n|H0] and E[n|H1] of the
SPRT, we calculate E[n|H0] and E[n|H1] of the Randomized-
SPRT as follows:
E[n|H0] =
(1− α′) ln β ′1−α′ + α′ ln 1−β
′
α′
(γ0) ln
γ1
(γ0)
+ (1− (γ0)) ln 1−γ11−(γ0)
E[n|H1] =
β ′ ln β
′
1−α′ + (1− β ′) ln 1−β
′
α′
γ1 ln
γ1
(γ0)
+ (1− γ1) ln 1−γ11−(γ0)
As shown in Figures 5 and 6, we examine how  affects the
number of observations needed to make a decision, E[n|H0]
FIGURE 5. The effect of γ0 on the expected number of samples
conditioned on H0 (no worm) when γ1 = 0.9, α′ = β′ = 0.01.
FIGURE 6. The effect of γ0 on the expected number of samples
conditioned on H1 (worm) when γ1 = 0.9, α′ = β′ = 0.01.
and E[n|H1]. We vary γ0 from 0.0 to 0.3 and fix γ1 = 0.9,
α′ = β ′ = 0.01. We first notice that the Randomized-SPRT
requires a small number of samples on average to make a
decision. Given a value of γ0, we observe that an increase
in  contributes to a decrease in both E[n|H0] and E[n|H1].
We also see that the growth rates of E[n|H0] and E[n|H1]
in the Randomized-SPRT are slower than the ones in the
SPRT. This is mainly because γ 0 < γ0 holds, and thus the
Randomized-SPRT requires fewer samples on average than
the SPRT.
2) COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
We define communication overhead as the average number of
communication patterns that need to be sent in the network
per time slot. In the benign case, in which there are no
compromised nodes in the network, the attestation-only phase
is only performed without going into the SPRT-attestation
phase, and hence the communication overhead is zero.
In the worm case, the SPRT-attestation phase is performed
by benign nodes among whose neighbors the fraction of
compromised nodes is at least τ . Assume that there are N
sensor nodes in the network. We also assume that pτ is the
fraction of nodes performing the SPRT-attestation phase in
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the network. Furthermore, we assume that every node per-
forming the SPRT-attestation phase receives on an average
b packets per time slot. Then the communication overhead
will be calculated as N×pτ×b. This means that every sensor
node needs to send pτ × b communication patterns per time
slot. This overhead will be temporarily incurred until worm
propagation is completely stopped by our proposed scheme
and the compromised nodes are revoked from the network.
Once all compromised nodes are revoked, the network will
go back to benign case with zero overhead. Hence, the com-
munication overhead is reasonable.
3) STORAGE OVERHEAD
We define storage overhead as the average number of com-
munication patterns that need to be stored by a sensor node.
Recall that each detector erases the saved information at the
end of each time slot. Moreover, the number of communica-
tion patterns received by a detector is equal to the number
stored by them.
In the benign case, the storage overhead is zero because the
SPRT-attestation phase is not executed. In the worm case, the
storage overhead is computed as follows. There are N × pd
detectors on average in the network, where pd is the detector
selection probability. Assume that a communication pattern is
received by c detectors on an average. By using the analysis
derived from the communication overhead computation, the
total number of communication patterns to be stored per time
slot in the network is calculated as c×N×pτ×bN×pd =
c×pτ×b
pd
. As a
result, storage overhead will be c×pτ×bN×pd ≈ O( c×bN ). Similar to
the communication overhead of the worm case, this overhead
is reasonable because it will be temporarily maintained until
worm propagation is completely detected by our proposed
scheme and the network goes back to the benign case.
V. SIMULATION STUDY
In this section, we will first describe our simulation environ-
ment and then present the simulation results.
For simplicity, we call our proposed scheme Randomized-
SPRT. We call our prior work [8] Attestation-Only.
A. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
We developed a simple simulation program to evaluate the
Randomized-SPRT and compare it with Attestation-Only.
In our simulation, we place 500 sensor nodes in a square
region of 200 m × 200 m and set the communication radius
of each sensor node to 50 m. We adopt a group deployment
strategy in which a group of sensor nodes is placed in the field
according to the two-dimensional Gaussian distribution:
f (x, y) = 1
2piσ 2
e−
(x−xg)2+(y−yg)2
2σ2
where (xg, yg) is the group deployment point and σ is the
standard deviation. We set the number of groups to 25, with
20 nodes in each group. We also set σ = 50, which is
equivalent to the communication radius of a sensor node.
Although time synchronization is not needed in the network
as mentioned in Section IV-C.3, for a simple time modeling,
we divide the entire time domain into 90 time slots such that
a time slot duration is 10 simulation seconds and perform the
simulation in units of time slots.
For Randomized-SPRT, we configure the detector selec-
tion probability to be pd = 0.1. We also set both the user-
configured false positive threshold α and the false negative
threshold β to 0.01, and we set the lower threshold γ0 and the
upper threshold γ1 to 0.1 and 0.9, respectively. The rationale
behind these configurations is discussed in Section IV-E.
Additionally, we configure max = 5.0, and thus  is
selected in each round uniformly at random from the range
of [1.0, 5.0).
Moreover, we set τ = 0.01 which is the threshold used
to initiate the Randomized-SPRT from the attestation-only
phase. We configure m = 50, 100 for the size of the set A
of attestees in the attestation-only phase.
We consider three cases for our evaluation: benign, benign-
compromise, and worm. In the benign case, nodes only send
benign packets. In this case, we focus on the performance of
the attestation-only phase under benign traffic. In the benign-
compromise case, nodes only send benign packets, but there
are a few nodes individually captured and compromised in the
network. In this case, we focus on the performance of both the
attestation-only and SPRT-attestation phases under benign
traffic. In the worm case, nodes only send worm packets, and
we focus on worm propagation detection.
In the benign case, we consider the data aggregation sce-
nario, which is the dominant communication pattern in sensor
networks [9]. Specifically, each node elects itself as an aggre-
gator with probability 0.1. Each aggregator collects benign
data packets from its source member nodes. We model the
transmission of benign data packets from a source member
node to an aggregator as a homogeneous Poisson process
with rate parameter λ. Therefore, the inter-transmission times
of benign data packets follow the exponential distribution.
More specifically, the inter-transmission time between two
consecutive benign data packets is calculated as − ln(U )
λ
,
where U is uniform random variate, 0 ≤ U < 1. We also
consider the configurations of λ = 0.05, 0.1, 0.15. Under
these configurations, each source member sends on average
45, 90, 135 benign packets, respectively, to the aggregator
in the 900 simulation seconds. If the ratio of the number of
collected data packets to the number of source members is
greater than or equal to a preset data aggregation threshold δ,
each aggregator performs the data aggregation process and
forwards an aggregated version of the data to a randomly
chosen parent aggregator. The data further propagates along
a tree hierarchy of aggregators, where the base station is the
root. We set δ = 1.0. Since there are only benign nodes
in the network, only the attestation-only phase is executed.
We thereby examine the performance of the attestation-only
phase under benign traffic.
In the benign-compromise case, benign traffic is generated
and transmitted through data aggregation as in the benign
case. Additionally, we place Nc = 1, 5 individually captured
690 VOLUME 5, 2017
J.-W. Ho, M. Wright: Distributed Detection of Sensor Worms Using Sequential Analysis and Remote Software Attestations
FIGURE 7. Cumulative number of infected nodes It vs. Time slot t when
there are no defense mechanisms against worm propagation.
and compromised nodes in the network. This case is an
intermediate stage between the benign case and the worm
case. In this case, the attacker can capture and compromise
a few number of nodes and prepare for worm propagation
with these compromised nodes. Since benign nodes coexist
with compromised nodes in the network, both the attestation-
only and SPRT-attestation phases are performed, and hence
we explore the performance of these two phases under benign
traffic.
In the worm case, as described in Section III, we employ
a discrete-time version of the simple epidemic model [2]
together with hop-by-hop and random worm propagation
strategies. Recall that ρ is the pairwise infection rate, I0 repre-
sents the number of worm originators and It is the cumulative
infection quota from the 0th time slot to the tth time slot.
In our simulation, we consider a single worm originator and
thus I0 is set to one. As shown in Figure 7, we simulate how
It grows over time with a variety of ρ values when the
worm is propagated without detection in the discrete-time
model. We see that It increases in line with the rise of t .
We also observe that the rise of ρ results in a reduction in
the number of time slots required for all sensor nodes to be
infected. Based on these simulation results, we set ρ from
0.0002 to 0.001 in increments of 0.0002.
B. SIMULATION RESULTS
We use the metrics in Table 1 to evaluate the performance of
Randomized-SPRT and compare it to Attestation-Only. We
also present the average results for 1000 runs of the simu-
lation in each configuration such that each run is executed
for 90 time slots. For each run, we acquire each metric as
the average of the results of the Randomized-SPRT that are
performed.
We summarize our findings in terms of average number
of samples in the Randomized-SPRT, worm defense capabil-
ity, and overheads. Recall that our proposed scheme utilizes
remote software attestation with virtually zero false positives
and we do not present any results on false positives.
TABLE 1. Performance evaluation metrics.
1) NUMBER OF SAMPLES TO REACH A DECISION WITH
RANDOMIZED-SPRT
The Randomized-SPRT is applied only when some compro-
mised nodes are detected using Attestation-Only, i.e. only for
the benign-compromise and worm cases. In both the benign-
compromise and worm cases for all settings we explored
(λ = 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, δ = 1.0), the average number of
samples was less than 2.4. Most importantly, this means that
the worm was detected quickly in all cases.
2) WORM DEFENSE CAPABILITY
We now present simulation results that show that
Randomized-SPRT has significantly better worm detection
and blocking capability than Attestation-Only, preventing a
worm from gaining more than 13.5% of the nodes in the
network in the worst case.
FIGURE 8. The effect pairwise infection rate ρ on the average fraction of
infected nodes in the worm case.
As shown in Figure 8, for Randomized-SPRT, the aver-
age fraction of nodes infected by a fast worm with ρ =
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0.001 reaches its maximum of 11.2% and 7.4% for the set-
tings m = 50 and m = 100, respectively. This indicates
that Randomized-SPRT substantially restrains the number
of nodes infected by a fast worm below at most 56 out of
500 nodes in the network, thereby minimizing the damage
incurred by fast-worm propagation. Additionally, the average
fraction of nodes infected by a slow worm with ρ = 0.0002
reaches its maximum of 13.5% and 8.4% for the settings
m = 50 and m = 100, respectively. Thus, Randomized-
SPRT substantially suppresses the number of nodes infected
by a slow worm below at most 67.5 nodes out of 500 nodes in
the network. Although the number of infected nodes is larger
than with the fast-worm, it is still low for detecting a stealthy
worm that aims to evade our mechanism. Given a value
of ρ, we notice that the average fraction of nodes infected
by a worm tends to decrease as m increases. This implies that
the more attestees set up in the network, the more infectious
nodes are detected in the attestation-only phase without going
into the SPRT-attestation phase, leading to faster blocking of
the worm infection.
Note that the average fraction of infected nodes is not
greatly affected by ρ. This signifies an advantage of our
proposed scheme in the sense that Randomized-SPRT can
maintain effective worm detection capability irrespective of
the infection rate.
When comparing Randomized-SPRT to Attestation-Only,
we see that Randomized-SPRT blocks worm propagation
with fewer infected nodes than Attestation-Only in all con-
figurations of m and ρ. In particular, when m = 50,
Randomized-SPRT reduces the average number of infected
nodes by between 28.4% and 43.6% compared to Attestation-
Only. When m = 100, Randomized-SPRT cuts infections
by between 16.9% and 33.5%. This demonstrates that our
proposed scheme outperforms our prior work in terms of
worm detection capability.
Figure 9 indicates the stop time slot at which all worm
propagation is detected and blocked for both Randomized-
SPRT and Attestation-Only. Worm propagation is stopped
sooner for faster worms than slower ones. We also observe
that an increase in m results in an earlier stop time slot, since
infectious node detection in the attestation-only phase is sped
up. Furthermore, the stop time slot in Randomized-SPRT
is several time slots earlier than for Attestation-Only in all
configurations of m and ρ.
3) OVERHEADS
In the following, we show simulation results demonstrating
that the overheads of Randomized-SPRT are quite low and
acceptable for a sensor network.
In the benign case, as shown in Figure 10, attestation
overhead ranges from 0.05 to 0.29 attestations per node per
time slot for all values of λ and m. This indicates that the
Randomized-SPRT requires very small attestation overhead
under benign traffic. Additionally, we see that increases in the
number of attestees and in benign traffic lead to an increase
in attestation overhead. Note that the benign case is virtually
FIGURE 9. The effect of pairwise infection rate ρ and number of
attestees m on the average time slot when to block worm propagation in
the worm case.
FIGURE 10. The impact of the number of attestees m and benign traffic
parameter λ on the average number of attestations per node per time slot
in the benign case.
the same as Attestation-Only in the sense that there are no
compromised nodes and no activation of the SPRT-attestation
phase.
In the benign-compromise case, attester notification over-
head varies from 0.002 to 0.003 when there is one compro-
mised node and varies from 0.016 to 0.017 when there are
five compromised nodes. Despite the increase, the absolute
overhead rate is still quite low. As shown in Figure 11, attes-
tation overhead tends to grow as the number compromised
nodes, the number of attestees, and benign traffic increase.
However, the average number of attestation operations per
node per time slot is below 0.7 and thus quite low. As shown
in Figures 12, 13, both communication pattern and storage
overheads tend to increase in accordance with a rise in the
number of compromised nodes and benign traffic. On the
other hand, a decrease in the number of attestees contributes
to an increase in the communication pattern and storage over-
heads. We infer from this observation that the smaller number
of attestees leads to less frequent execution of the attestation-
only phase, resulting in more frequent execution of the
SPRT-attestation phase and growth in the communication
pattern and storage overheads. However, we observe that the
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FIGURE 11. The impact of the number of attestees m and benign traffic
parameter λ with number of compromised nodes Nc on the average
number of attestations per node per time slot in the benign-compromise
case.
FIGURE 12. The effect of attestees m and benign traffic parameter λ with
number of compromised nodes Nc on the average number of
communication patterns sent by a node per time slot in the
benign-compromise case.
communication and storage overheads are still reasonably
sustained at below six patterns and three patterns, respec-
tively.
In summary, we see that the number of compromised
nodes plays a key role in incurring the overheads in benign-
compromise case. This is mainly because an increase in node
compromise expedites the execution of the SPRT-attestation
phase, leading to expansion in overheads caused by the SPRT.
However, the attacker would prefer to not need to capture
and compromise a large number of nodes and instead prefer
a worm or other wide-spread, automated attack.
In the worm case, Figure 14 shows how ρ and m affect the
attestation overheads of Randomized-SPRT and Attestation-
Only. In Randomized-SPRT, we see that the attestation over-
head tends to increase with a rise in the worm infection rate
ρ. Note that each node performs at most 0.31 attestations
on average per time slot in all cases of (m, ρ). This indi-
cates that Randomized-SPRT requires a very small number of
attestations for worm detection and blocking. In addition, we
observe that Randomized-SPRT needs slightly higher attes-
tation overhead than Attestation-Only for all configurations
FIGURE 13. The effect of attestees m and benign traffic parameter λ with
number of compromised nodes Nc on the average number of
communication patterns stored in a node per time slot in the
benign-compromise case.
FIGURE 14. The impact of pairwise infection rate ρ and number of
attestees m on the average number of attestations per node per time slot
in the worm case.
of ρ and m. The additional attestation overhead incurred by
Randomized-SPRT is due to the SPRT process, but it does
not exceed 0.24 attestations per time slot on average, which
is very small when compared to the benefit of more effective
worm detection from employing the Randomized-SPRT.
As shown in Figure 15, communication pattern overhead
with Randomized-SPRT increases as ρ increases. Each node,
however, generates fewer than 0.09 communication patterns
on average per time slot in all cases of (m, ρ). We also note
that the communication pattern overhead when m = 100 is
lower than when m = 50. This implies that for higher m,
the attestation-only phase is more frequently performed than
the SPRT-attestation phase, resulting in the occurrence of the
lower communication pattern overhead. Storage overhead is
equal to the communication pattern overhead in the worm
case. This is because worm always targets susceptible nodes
for infection and thus all communication patterns incurred
by worm propagation are distinct, causing all communication
patterns be stored in detectors.
Figure 16 shows how ρ and m affect the attester
notification overheads for Randomized-SPRT and
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FIGURE 15. The effect of pairwise infection rate ρ and number of
attestees m on the average number of communication patterns sent by a
node per time slot in the worm case.
FIGURE 16. The effect of pairwise infection rate ρ and number of
attestees m on the the average number of attester notification messages
sent by a node per time slot in the worm case.
Attestation-Only. As ρ grows, attester notification overhead
in the Randomized-SPRT tends to increase. This indicates
that fast worm infection speeds up the dissemination of
the attester notification messages. As expected, the attester
notification overhead in Randomized-SPRT is higher than the
one in Attestation-Only. This makes sense because the SPRT
process incurs the cost of extra attester notification messages
to achieve a superior worm detection capability. Nevertheless,
in all cases of (m, ρ) for Randomized-SPRT, each detector
sends to their neighbors fewer than 0.31 attester notification
messages on average per time slot.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a Randomized-SPRT scheme for
worm detection in wireless sensor networks. We have ana-
lyzed our scheme and showed that it detects worm propaga-
tion in just a few samples, thereby substantially restricting the
number of infected nodes while incurring reasonable commu-
nication and storage overheads.We also evaluated the scheme
through simulation, showing that our scheme achieves fast
worm propagation detection with little attestation overhead.
In a reasonably short time, e.g. between 8 and 27 time slots,
our scheme blocks worm propagation with at most 13.5%
of the network infected. These results are significantly better
than a scheme based only on node attestation.
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